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SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICTS IN FLORIDA
DAVID M. HUDSON*
Over twenty years ago, Professor John C. Bollens referred to
special districts as the "new dark continent of American politics,"'
a phrase which he noted had been earlier applied to counties.2
However quaint this expression may seem today, it is archaic in
the sense that special districts, like their geographical analogue,
have come of age. No longer are they hidden and mysterious with
little impact on the establishment in the civilized world. Today in
Florida there are more than 1,000 special districtsa-twice the
combined number of counties (67) and municipalities (389).4
Special districts perform functions and provide services which
daily affect the lives of all Floridians. They have been established
to provide services including free public schools,5 hospitals,6 drain-
age,7 airports,8 fire control,9 mosquito control,10 water hyacinth
control,"1 and recreational facilities.12 In short, special districts
may perform a full range of governmental and proprietary func-
tions, all of which could be performed by county or municipal gov-
ernment. Until recently, most special districts were organized to
perform a single purpose or provide a single service, and to do so
as an alternative to having the county or municipal government
directly involved. Today, general law authority exists for the crea-
tion of special districts to provide multiple services and facilities,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. Wake Forest 1968; J.D. Florida
State University 1974; L.L.M. (Taxation) University of Florida 1975; L.L.M. London School
of Economics, University of London 1980.
1. J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1957).
2. H.S. GILBERTSON, THE CouNTY: THE "DARK CONTINENT" OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1917).
3. Fla. H.R. Committee on Community Affairs, Independent Special Districts in Florida,
Staff Report 1 (1979). The Department of Veteran and Community Affairs is now required
to compile and publish annually a general census of local government. The 1981 Census
reports 486 independent special districts in Florida in 1979; dependent special districts are
not tallied. State of Florida, Department of Veteran and Community Affairs, Census of Lo-
cal Governments 2 (1981).
4. FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, 531.
5. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
6. E.g., Marion County Hospital District, 1965 Fla. Laws, ch. 65-1905.
7. E.g., Central Charlotte Drainage District, 1969 Fla. Laws, ch. 69-932.
8. E.g., Hernando County Aviation Authority, 1961 Fla. Laws, ch. 61-2229, as amended
by 1970 Fla. Laws, ch. 70-706.
9. E.g., Lehigh Acres Fire Control District, 1967 Fla. Laws, ch. 67-1633.
10. E.g., Amelia Island Mosquito Control District, 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-781.
11. E.g., Lee County Hyacinth Control District, 1967 Fla. Laws, ch. 67-1629.
12. E.g., Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District, 1963 Fla. Laws, ch.
63-2023.
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and to do so in conjunction with (indeed, often as the alter ego of)
the county. 3
The power to tax is, perhaps, the paramount governmental
power. It has in many instances been granted to special districts,
but not uniformly, and not without limitation. The focus of this
paper is on the taxing power of special district governments in
Florida.
To begin any analysis or discussion of special districts, a defini-
tion of what one means by the term is in order. Fortunately, there
is not a lack of definitions. Writers in local governmental law and
public administration provide us with the general notion that spe-
cial districts:
are organized entities, possessing a structural form, an official
name, perpetual succession, and the rights to sue and be sued, to
make contracts, and to obtain and dispose of property. They have
officers who are popularly elected or are chosen by other public
officials. They have a high degree of public accountability. 4
The Florida Legislature has provided several statutory defini-
tions, each of which is in keeping with the foregoing general con-
cept. The first, within the context of chapter 165, Formation of
Local Governments, provides: 'Special district' means a local unit
of special government created pursuant to general or special law
for the purposes of performing prescribed, specialized functions
within limited boundaries."' 5
13. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q), (5) (1981).
14. J. BOLLENS, supra note 1, at 1.
Professor Pock is more graphic, noting that the term has often been used to describe
"what was left of the totality of local governments after conventional and easily identifiable
cities, counties, townships, and villages had been removed,. . . an amorphous sort of scrap
heap through which writers were in the habit of rummaging until they found the particular
device that was the object of their immediate interest." M.A. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL
DISTRICTS: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 10 (1962).
15. FLA. STAT. § 165.031(5) (1981). This definition is particularly significant because
chapter 165 now provides the exclusive procedure pursuant to general law for forming or
dissolving special districts, except in those counties operating under a home rule charter
which provides for an exclusive method as specifically authorized by the constitution. FLA.
CONST. art. VIII § 6(e). FLA. STAT. § 165.022 (1981); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 075-108 (1975).
Subsequently, the Legislature has provided by general law an alternative procedure exclu-
sively for the establishment of community development districts. FLA. STAT. § 190.005
(1981). A "community development district" is a local or regional unit of special-purpose
government created pursuant to chapter 190 and limited to the specialized functions author-
ized therein. The governing head is an independent body created, organized, constituted
and authorized to function specifically as prescribed in chapter 190 for the delivery of urban
community development services. FLA. STAT. § 190.003(6) (1981). In addition, the Legisla-
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A similar, but slightly less broad, definition is supplied for pur-
poses of part III of chapter 218, Financial Matters Pertaining to
Political Subdivisions, Local Financial Management and Report-
ing: "'Special district' means a local unit of special government,
except district school boards and community college districts, cre-
ated pursuant to general or special law for the purpose of perform-
ing prescribed specialized functions, including urban service func-
tions, within limited boundaries.""' The exclusion of district school
boards and community college districts reflects the scope of the
substantive provisions of chapter 218 rather than any definitional
distinctions, although school districts may be distinguished from
other special districts on the basis of their current constitutional
foundation.17
I. HISTORY OP SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN FLORIDA
Providing authority for the creation of special districts for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining public roads was one of
the first acts"8 of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Flor-
ida. 9 The legislation signed by Governor William P. DuVal on
September 13, 1822, established a procedure whereby interested
householders could petition the county court for the appointment
of three to five commissioners 0 who were authorized and charged
with the duty of laying out the road for which the petition had
ture has, by a three-fifths vote of each house as prescribed by the constitution, FLA. CONST.
art. III, § 11(a)(21), prohibited itself from enacting any special laws pertaining to the future
creation of independent special districts for any of the purposes set forth in chapter 190.
FLA. STAT. § 190.049 (1981).
16. FLA. STAT. § 218.31(5) (1981). The Special Districts Disclosure Act of 1979, 1979 Fla.
Laws, ch. 79-183, (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 189 (1981)), adopts by reference the § 218.31(5)
definition. FLA. STAT. § 189.003(1) (1981). Also reflecting the governmental nature of special
districts are the provisions of the general Florida Statutes definitions contained in § 1.01(9):
"The words 'public body,' 'body politic' or 'political subdivision' include counties, cities,
towns, villages, special tax school districts, special road and bridge districts, bridge districts
and all other districts in this state." FLA. STAT. § 1.01(9) (1981).
17. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
18. An Act Concerning Roads, Highways and Ferries, Acts of the Legislative Council,
AcTs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, FLORIDA TERRITORIAL SESSION LAWS (September 13,
1822).
19. The Legislative Council provided for by Congress, Act of March 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 5,
3 Stat. 654 (1822), was comprised of thirteen "of the most fit and discreet" citizens ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Council, along with the Territo-
rial Governor, constituted the unified government of the Territory of Florida.
20. The commissioners "shall be householders, resident in said county, not interested or
living in the direction the road is to be run out." An Act Concerning Roads, Highways, and
Ferries, supra note 18, at 1 2.
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been filed.2 Subsequently, the county court was to appoint one or
more justices of the peace to apportion the roads within the county
into "road districts of convenient length. 2 2 In turn, the clerk of
the county court was to appoint an overseer 23 for each district to
organize the labor force necessary to build or repair the district's
roads. 24 While the road districts created under this act did not
have the power of taxation, they did have the power of
conscription:
[A1ll able bodied free white males between the age of sixteen
and forty-five years, and residents for ninety days within any
county in this Territory and all able bodied male slaves of the
same age and residence, shall be subject to work on the public
roads and highways in such county.26
The Legislative Council, therefore, recognized that providing
roads and highways, essential in a growing territory as a means for
communication and transportation, was a function which could
best be served by local citizens exercising governmental powers
under the general supervisory umbrella of county government.
Further, the scheme recognized that the needs and interests of re-
sidents of a county will often differ depending on where they reside
within the county, and thus an entity whose geographical jurisdic-
tion could be molded to fit local needs would be more responsive
and effective than the county government itself.26
The first legislative provision for special districts was by what
might be referred to in contemporary terms as general enabling
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1 5.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 11 9, 11. The overseer was also charged with the duty to post road signs or
directions within the district. Id. at 1 13.
25. Id. at T 6. Failure to respond to the overseer's notice to report for work subjected one
to a fine of one dollar per day of non-attendance. Id. at T 9. The requirement of labor upon
public roads and streets is not a tax. Galloway v. Town of Tavares, 19 So. 170 (Fla. 1896).
26. The Florida Legislature again recognized the importance of providing for a good sys-
tem of public roads and highways when, during the first general assembly held after state-
hood was granted in 1845, legislation was enacted which essentially codified the territorial
act discussed above. 1845 Fla. Laws, ch. 53. The Territorial Act itself had been given contin-
uing vitality by the 1838 state constitution, FLA. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (1839); the 1845
legislation made some changes to various provisions. As some indication of the order of
priorities existing at the time, it was not until 1848 that the Legislature passed legislation to
provide for the establishment of public schools in Florida. 1848 Fla. Laws, ch. 229 (passed
the House of Representatives, December 22, 1848; passed the Senate, December 30, 1848;
approved by the Governor, January 10, 1849). See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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legislation; however, early on the Legislature also turned to the
equivalent of today's special act, whereby the Legislature itself
creates a special district. In 1854, the Legislature designated five
commissioners and empowered them to:
cause to be drained the body of Land known as the "Alachua Sa-
vannah," in the county of Alachua, by turning the waters of
Newnan's Lake into Orange Lake, by ditching the Savannah and
making a cut into Orange Lake, or by such other means as the
Commissioners deem economical and necessary."'
In order to pay for the improvements contemplated by the Act,
the commissioners were authorized to assess the lands in the
Alachua Savannah area a sum not to exceed $35,000. Specific as-
sessments were to be made against particular landowners in pro-
portion to the quantity and quality of acreage to be benefited by
the improvements.2 8 Provisions were included to provide the land-
owners with notice of their assessment, opportunity for an admin-
istrative appeal, and procedures for the collection of assessments
not timely paid.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS
Special districts may, depending upon one's objectives, be classi-
fied according to a variety of criteria. For example, for purposes of
imposing requirements of financial management and reporting, a
distinction is made based upon who constitutes the governing head
of the special district or establishes its budget. An "independent
special district" has as its governing head an independent body
and its budget is established independently of the local governing
authority. 9 By contrast, the governing head of a "dependent spe-
cial district" is the local governing authority, or its budget is estab-
lished by the local governing authority.30 However, such a classifi-
cation for purposes of an analysis of the taxing powers of special
districts is not particularly helpful. As we shall see, the important
constitutional distinction relevant to the ad valorem taxing power
of special districts is whether the district serves a "county pur-
pose" or a "municipal purpose" and is within the ten mill cap im-
27. 1855 Fla. Laws, ch. 614.
28. Hence, the improvements were to be financed by special assessment rather than by
taxes. For a discussion of the distinction, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
29. FLA. STAT. § 218.31(7) (1981).
30. FLA. STAT. § 218.31(6) (1981).
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posed by the constitution for each of those purposes, or whether
the special district escapes the ten mill limitation and falls under
the broader provision permitting whatever" millage has been ap-
proved by referendum of the resident electors.3 1 Examination of
this distinguishing feature will be deferred until discussion of the
taxing power of special districts;32 however, two classifications of
special districts shall be discussed separately at this point because
of the special treatment accorded them in the Florida
Constitution.
The first of these two categories is the school districts. Histori-
cally, the administration and financing of Florida's public schools
has been perceived as a local responsibility, but one which general
purpose local government was not best suited to serve. Special dis-
tricts to provide local public schools were created as the population
grew and the need arose. Initially the state constitution provided
that a county or counties might be divided into convenient school
districts,"3 and municipalities were permitted to be school districts
as well.3 4 By 1947 there were almost 600 school districts.3 " This
caused many administrative problems and precipitated legislation
consolidating them into sixty-seven school districts, whose bounda-
ries were coextensive with the counties.3 6 This formulation of the
school districts now enjoys a constitutional foundation.3 7 Similarly,
the formulation of the school districts' governing body 8 and the
description of the purpose these districts are to serve 9 is pre-
scribed in the constitution. Additionally, school districts have spe-
cific constitutional power to levy ad valorem taxes" and issue
bonds.4 1 Therefore, while school districts are clearly not units of
general local government, and although they fit within the general
definition of a special district, they will not receive further consid-
31. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).
32. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
33. FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 10 (1885).
34. Id. art. XII, § 11.
35. See, F. BRYANT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OP FLORIDA 144-45 (1957).
36. 1947 Fla. Laws, ch. 23726, § 12.
37. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a). Two or more contiguous counties may combine into one
school district upon approval by the electors in each county. Id.
38. An elected school board shall be composed of five or more members. FLA. CONST. art
IX, § 4(a).
39. The school board is to operate, control and supervise all free public schools within
the school district. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b). The general law provisions relating to educa-
tion are found at FLA. STAT. ch. 228-246 (1981).
40. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a).
41. Id. § 12.
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eration in this paper because of their peculiar constitutional status
and their familiar, uniform presence throughout Florida.
The other classification of special districts which receives special
constitutional consideration is the one providing water manage-
ment facilities and services. In 1972 the Legislature attempted to
reorganize the various water management districts in the state and
place them under the general oversight of the Department of Nat-
ural Resources.4 2 The state was divided into five water manage-
ment districts.43 The effective date was initially set for July 1,
1973,"" but was postponed until December 31, 1976."" As part of
the overall legislative response to the issues involving water man-
agement, an amendment to the constitution was proposed relating
to the maximum millage which could be levied for water manage-
ment purposes:"6
Ad valorem taxes . . . shall not be levied in excess of the fol-
lowing millages upon the assessed value of real estate and tangi-
ble personal property ... for water management purposes for the
northwest portion of the state lying west of the line between
ranges two and three east, 0.05 mill; for water management pur-
poses for the remaining portions of the state, 1.0 mill .... 4
Water management districts constituted under the Florida
Water Resources Act"8 have their power to levy ad valorem taxes'9
limited by the above quoted constitutional provision.50 It is un-
resolved, however, what impact that provision has on ad valorem
taxes levied by a county, a municipality or another special district
for "water management purposes."
42. The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-299, (codified at
FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1981)).
43. 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-299, § 12, (codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.069 (1981)).
44. 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-190, § 6.
45. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-125, § 1.
46. Chapter 75-245 provided for a special election to be held on March 9, 1976. 1975 Fla.
Laws, ch. 75-245. The amendment was approved and became effective January 4, 1977, in
accordance with article XI of the constitution. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c).
47. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b).
48. 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-299, (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (1981)).
49. Such ad valorem taxes are authorized by FLA. STAT. § 373.0697 (1981).
50. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 076-7 (1976).
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS
A. Constitutional Considerations
None of Florida's constitutions has ever contained a provision
specifically authorizing the creation of special districts, either by
way of general enabling legislation or by special act. However, the
earliest courts to address the issue relied upon the fundamental
concept that the constitution is one of limitation and, unless it
contains an express prohibition, the Legislature has the inherent
power to use such a vehicle to effectuate valid public purposes.' 1
The current Florida Constitution, adopted in 1968, is likewise si-
lent on the issue of legislative power to create special districts."
The polestar of this maxim is that the special district must be cre-
ated to further a public purpose.'8 However, the determination of
what is a public, as opposed to a private, purpose is generally left
by the courts to the discretion of the Legislature."
51. This was the thought behind the discussion of this point in Stewart v. De
Land-Lake Helen Special Rd. and Bridge Dist., 71 So. 42, 50 (Fla. 1916). The court in
Hunter v. Owens, 86 So. 839, 844 (Fla. 1920), was more succinct:
It is within the power of the Legislature to establish a district of the character
here considered as a governmental agency to effect the lawful public purpose of
conserving the public health, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the district and
its inhabitants, and to impose an ad valorem tax therefor.
The constitutional issue had been addressed even earlier by the United States Supreme
Court, albeit in considering an act of the legislature of the state of Connecticut, in Williams
v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 311 (1898):
Neither can it be doubted that, if the state constitution does not prohibit, the
legislature, speaking generally, may create a new taxing district, determine what
territory shall belong to such district and what property shall be considered as
benefited by a proposed improvement. And in so doing it is not compelled to give
notice to the parties resident within the territory or permit a hearing before itself,
one of its committees, or any other tribunal, as to the question whether the prop-
erty so included within the taxing district is in fact benefited.
52. The constitution continues the powers, jurisdiction and government of special dis-
tricts existing on the effective date of the 1968 revision, November 5, 1968. FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 6(b). Similarly, the ad valorem taxing powers and authorized tax millages of special
districts were continued. Id. art. XII, §§ 2, 15. Limitations on the taxing and bonding pow-
ers of special districts were imposed. Id. art. VII, §§ 9, 10, 12, 14. In addition the Legislature
has been effectively limited in the creation of special districts to provide public schools. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
53. See Jinkins v. Entzminger, 135 So. 785, 789 (Fla. 1931).
54. In Hunter v. Owens, 86 So. 839 (Fla. 1920), the court upheld the creation of a special
district which had been established "to effect the lawful public purpose of conserving the
public health, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the district and its inhabitants." Id. at
844. The court held that the legislative declaration of the public purpose to be served would
be sustained:
unless it clearly appears from the act itself, or from a consideration of the circum-
stances and conditions within which it is to operate, that the law in reality has no
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Indeed, apparently only one special district has been judicially
invalidated on the ground that the district was not serving a valid
public purpose. 5 At issue was the Walkill Stump & Land Clearing
District, created under the authority of a Special Act 56 of the Leg-
islature "for the purpose of having such lands stumped and
cleared, either in whole or in part, for sanitary or agricultural pur-
poses, or when the same may be conducive to the public health,
convenience or welfare, or of public utility or benefit by stumping
or clearing. ' 57 The court noted that the question of what is a pub-
lic purpose "is a matter to be decided by the courts based upon the
conditions, customs, and usages prevailing in each state. 58 Re-
viewing past decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, the court ob-
served that drainage had been held to be a public purpose even
though it was only for the reclamation of lands to make them
available for cultivation and settlement. Nonetheless, the court
stated that "this court does not believe that there is any basis
upon which the Florida Supreme Court would make a decision
holding that the pulling of stumps or the clearing of land is a pub-
lic purpose any more than that plowing is a public purpose. 5 9
B. Methods of Establishing Special Districts
Prior to 1974, special districts in Florida were established either
directly by the Legislature, or by legislation which established the
procedures for local citizens or governmental entities to follow in
creating a special district. When the Legislature itself created the
fair relation to the public purpose stated or manifestly intended, or that it in ef-
fect violates organic law while superficially appearing to serve a lawful public
purpose.
Id. The court in State ex rel. Davis v. Ryan, 151 So. 416 (Fla. 1933), expressed the concept
more forcefully:
Such a special taxing district may be established by the Legislature for particular
public purposes, and, if created directly by the Legislature, must be recognized
and can only be judicially set aside upon a showing of gross abuse of the legislative
power in the enactment of its act of creation.
Id. at 418. More recently courts have imposed the requirement of public access, at least
for special districts providing recreational facilities: "Without that availability, there is no
public purpose." State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II Special Recreation Dist., 383 So. 2d 631,
633 (Fla. 1980).
55. St. Paul Trust & Sav. Bank v. American Clearing Co., 291 F. 212 (S.D. Fla. 1923),
aff'd sub nom., Citizens' Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Trust & Say. Bank, 10 F.2d 1017
(5th Cir. 1926).
56. 1919 Fla. Laws, ch. 8008.
57. Id. § 1.
58. 291 F. at 227.
59. Id. at 228.
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special district it was generally by a special act effective either
upon becoming law,60 or upon subsequent ratification by the af-
fected electorate.6' General law authorization for the creation of
special districts upon the initiative of local citizens became a popu-
lar approach and the Florida Statutes became rife with provisions
for creating special districts. Each of these laws had its own unique
procedure to be followed in creating a district. The basic approach
may be illustrated by the general law authorizing the creation of
special districts for the purpose of mosquito control.",
The first step was to circulate a petition among the registered
electors residing in the proposed district.6 3 The petition was to de-
scribe the territory to be included in the district," and reiterate
that "the eradication or control of mosquitoes . . . is necessary for
the preservation of the public health, comfort and welfare of the
inhabitants."" After fifteen percent or more of the resident regis-
tered electors signed the petition, the second step was to present
the petition to the board of county commissioners." The petition
would request an election to determine whether the district should
be created and, if so, to elect a board of commissioners for the dis-
trict.7 The board of county commissioners was then to perform
the essentially perfunctory tasks of determining that the petition
had been signed by the requisite number of qualified individuals,
that the improvements to be made were "for the benefit of the
public health, comfort and welfare of the inhabitants," and that "it
is feasible and practicable to eradicate or control mosquitoes and
other arthropods in [the] territory."68 After the board placed its
60. E.g., the Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities District, created by 1953
Fla. Laws, ch. 29590, (repealed and superceded by 1955 Fla. Laws, ch. 31343 § 20).
61. E.g., 1955 Fla. Laws, ch. 30666, providing for the creation of a fire control district in
Collier County, was not to become effective until ratified by a majority of the qualified
electors voting in an election called by the board of county commissioners. Id. § 15. This act
was subsequently so approved, thereby creating the Immokalee Fire Control District. See
1957 Fla. Laws, ch. 57-1236.
62. FLA. STAT. ch. 388 (1973).
63. Id. § 388.031.
64. The territory of the district could include "any city town, or county, or any portion
or portions thereof, whether such portion or portions include incorporated territory or por-
tions of two or more counties in the state." Id. § 388.021.
65. Id. § 388.031 (declaration of the public purpose to be served).
66. Id. Presumably, if the district was to encompass territory in two or more counties,
the petition was to be presented to the board of county commissioners of each affected
county.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 388.041.
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imprimatur on the petition,69 the third phase was ushered in-the
submission of the issue to a referendum of the registered electors
residing within the proposed district.70 At the same election, the
three members of the board of commissioners were to be chosen
from write-in candidates or from candidates nominated by peti-
tion.71 A simple majority of the votes cast in the election in favor
of creating the district obligated the board of county commission-
ers to take the final step of entering its order constituting the dis-
trict and designating it by name.72 The three persons receiving the
highest number of votes cast were to be the commissioners of the
district.7
More generally, as part of the trend towards home rule, counties
were given direct general power in 1971 to:
establish... special purpose districts, for any part or all of the
unincorporated area of the county, of which the board of county
commissioners shall be the governing body... [for] fire protec-
tion, law enforcement, beach erosion control, recreation facilities,
water, streets, sidewalks, street lighting, garbage and trash collec-
tion and disposal, waste and sewage collection and disposal,
drainage, and other essential facilities and services.74
This specific legislative grant was precipitated by an opinion of
Attorney General Robert L. Shevin7 5 that, absent such general law
authorization, a county could not establish by home rule ordinance
a special taxing district in the unincorporated area of the county to
provide a municipal-type service, such as street lighting. Special
districts, however, could be created pursuant to the 1971 legisla-
tion simply by the enactment of a county ordinance.
In 1974 the Legislature enacted two laws which affected the pro-
cedures for creating special districts. The first was chapter 74-19176
which amended the provisions relating to the home rule powers of
counties,7 7 by providing:
69. The board of county commissioners' determination "that the petition is in all re-
spects strictly in accordance with the requirements of law, shall be regarded for all purposes
as conclusive." Id.
70. Id. §§ 388.051, .061.
71. Id. § 388.081.
72. Id. § 388.071.
73. Id. § 388.101.
74. 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-14, § 1 (17) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q) (1981)).
75. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 071-95 (1971).
76. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-191.
77. FLA. STAT. ch. 125 (1973).
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125.01 Powers and duties.-(1) The legislative and governing
body of a county shall have the power to carry on county govern-
ment. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law,
this power shall include, but shall not be restricted, to the power
to:
(q) Establish, and subsequently merge or abolish those cre-
ated hereunder, op--'al purpoe d t . icts municipal service taxing
or benefit units for any part or all of the unincorporated area of
the county, within which may be provided fire protection, law en-
forcement, beach erosion control, recreation service and facilities,
water, streets, sidewalks, street lighting, garbage and trash collec-
tion and disposal, waste and sewage collection and disposal,
drainage, transportation and other essential facilities and munici-
pal services from funds derived from service charges, special as-
sessments, or taxes within such distrit unit only. It is hereby de-
clared to be the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph is
the authorization for all counties to levy additional taxes within
the limits fixed for municipal purposes within such municipal ser-
vice taxing units under the authority of the second sentence of
Article VII, Section 9(b) of the state constitution.78
Another section of the same act added a new provision pertain-
ing to the creation of "special districts," in contrast to "municipal
service taxing or benefit units":
To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, the
governing body of a county shall have the power to establish, and
subsequently merge or abolish those created hereunder, special
districts for any part or all of the county including incorporated
areas if the governing body of the incorporated area affected ap-
proves such creation by ordinance within which may be provided
municipal services and facilities from funds derived from service
charges, special assessments, or taxes within such district only.
Such ordinance may be subsequently amended by the same pro-
cedure as the original enactment.7'
Municipalities have not been granted express authority to create
special districts, but their power to do so is implied in the broad
grant of home rule power contained in the 1968 constitution 0 and
78. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-191, § 1. Underscored language was added by the Act; struck
through language was deleted.
79. Id. § 4. This section was subsequently amended by 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-407, § 1
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 125.01(5)(a) (1981)).
80. FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 2(b).
SPECIAL TAXING DISTRICTS
the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.81
The other significant piece of legislation enacted in 1974 which
pertained to the establishment of special districts was the Forma-
tion of Local Governments Act.58 Two years earlier the Legislature
created the Commission on Local Government and charged it, in-
ter alia, to study the operation and organization of counties, school
districts, municipalities and special districts, and to recommend
executive, statutory or constitutional changes necessary to improve
local government.88 The Commission issued a number of interim
reports and drafted proposed legislation addressing many of the
problem areas it uncovered." One recommendation was that the
myriad of provisions establishing procedures for the creation of
special districts be repealed and replaced by a single, uniform pro-
cedure.8 5 The legislative intent in this regard was expressly stated:
It is further the purpose of this act to provide viable and usable
general law standards and procedures for forming and dissolving
municipalities and special districts in lieu of any procedure or
standards now provided by general or special law. The provisions
of this act shall be the exclusive procedure pursuant to general
81. 1973 Fla. Laws, ch. 73-129, (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1981)). Section 166.021(3)
provides: "The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in §
2(b), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the
power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature
may act [with certain enumerated exceptions]." It should be emphasized that the discussion
thus far has focused simply on the power to create a special district which has the power to
levy ad valorem taxes. See infra Part V. Thus, Attorney General Jim Smith reached the
conclusion that a municipality may not by ordinance create a special district and confer
upon such district the power to levy ad valorem taxes within the district. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla.
078-92 (1978). The power of a municipality to create a special district lacking ad valorem
taxing power was noted by reference to the provisions of § 165.041(2): "A charter for crea-
tion of a special district shall be adopted only by special act of the legislature or by ordi-
nance of a county or municipal governing body having jurisdiction over the area affected."
Accord, Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 078-128 (1978).
In a charter county, the charter might preempt to the county the power to create special
districts, in which case municipalities within that county would lack such power. The Dade
County Charter contains such a provision. Dade County Charter, art. I, § 1.01(A)(11). Op.
Att'y Gen. Fla. 074-244 (1974).
82. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-192.
83. 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-44, § 1.
84. A summary of the Interim Reports and copies of proposed legislation are contained
in the FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LocAL GOVERNMENT (June 30, 1974). Copies of
all of the Interim Reports and the Final Report are available at the Florida State Library,
the Legislative Service Library and the Department of Community Affairs.
85. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, app. V, 29 (June 30,
1974). The Commission also recommended the Municipal Home Rule Act, id. at 15, and the
amendments to the county home rule powers. Id. at 25. For a discussion of these acts, see
supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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law for forming or dissolving municipalities and special districts
in this state except in those counties operating under a home rule
charter which provides for an exclusive method as specifically au-
thorized by the state constitution in article VIII, section 6(e). Any
provisions of a general or special law, existing on the effective
date of this act, in conflict with the provisions of this act shall not
be effective to the extent of such conflict."
In the future, there were to be only three methods for creating
special districts: "by special act of the Legislature or by ordinance
of a county or municipal governing body having jurisdiction over
the area affected. '8 7
The creation of a special district by county or municipal ordi-
nance may be initiated by the respective governing body or, in cer-
tain circumstances, a county may be obliged to address the issue of
whether a special district should be created. Either the governing
body of a municipality by resolution, or the citizens of a munici-
pality or county by petition, may identify a service or program
which ostensibly benefits property or residents only in the unincor-
porated area of the county but which is financed by countywide
revenues." The board of county commissioners must respond to
the resolution or petition within ninety days with a finding of fact
that the service or program in issue does not specially benefit the
property or residents of the unincorporated areas, or it must take
action to develop "appropriate mechanisms" to correct the prob-
lem.89 The options available to the county for financing activities
86. 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-192, § 1, (codified at FLA. STAT. § 165.022 (1979)). The Attor-
ney General has stated that the methods of creating a water management district under
special or general law had been superseded by the provisions of Chapter 74-192 and such
districts may, in the future, be established only in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 075-108 (1975).
87. FLA. STAT. § 165.041(2) (1981). The act also provided an exclusive procedure for the
dissolution of a special district, id. § 165.051, and for the merger of two or more special
districts or of municipalities or counties with special districts. Id. § 165.041(4). See infra
note 287.
88. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(6)(a) (1981).
89. Id. § 125.01(6)(b). The foundation for this statutory provision is section 1(h) of arti-
cle VIII of the Florida Constitution: "Property situate within municipalities shall not be
subject to taxation for services rendered by the county exclusively for the benefit of the
property or residents in unincorporated areas." This provision was added to the Florida
Constitution by the 1968 revision. Initially the courts interpreted it rather narrowly. In City
of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), the court
held that:
[Tihe proper interpretation of the language of this section of the Constitution
does not require a direct and primary use benefit from a particular service to city-
located property in order to remove the same from the proscription of the consti-
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which do not benefit municipal property or residents are to impose
taxes, special assessments or user fees only upon residents or prop-
erty in the unincorporated areas, or to establish a municipal ser-
vice taxing or benefit unit. 0 Alternatively, the county may remit to
the nonbenefited municipality or municipalities a portion of the
county ad valorem taxes collected therefrom which are attributable
to the program or service which benefits only the property or re-
sidents in the unincorporated areas.91
tutional provision. It is sufficient to authorize county taxation of such property if
the benefits accruing to the municipal areas are found to be real and substantial
and not merely illusory, ephemeral and inconsequential.
Id. at 823. Applying this test to the facts before it, the court concluded that a master sewage
treatment plant located in the unincorporated area of Pinellas County would, by eliminating
pollution and contamination of the soils, waters and streams of the unincorporated areas,
thereby substantially benefit, health-wise and recreation-wise, the incorporated areas. Id. at
824.
This sentiment was codified by the enactment of § 1 of chapter 79-87 of the Laws of
Florida (codified at FLA. STAT. § 125.01(7) (1981)):
No county revenues, except those derived specifically from or on behalf of a mu-
nicipal service taxing unit, special district, unincorporated area, service area, or
program area, shall be used to fund any service or project provided by the county
where no real and substantial benefit accrues to the property or residents within a
municipality or municipalities.
In Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1976), which involved a tax year prior to
the enactment of § 125.01(6) in 1974, the court held that: "Article VIII, Section 1(h) of the
Florida Constitution is self-executing, and that with or without legislative interpretation the
courts will be required to draw the lines between acceptable and prohibited municipal taxa-
tion." Id. at 460 (footnote omitted). On remand, findings of fact were made that municipali-
ties within the county did benefit from county provided libraries and sheriff's road patrols,
but not from certain "neighborhood parks" maintained by the county in unincorporated
areas and a county operated emergency medical service program. Alsdorf v. Broward
County, 373 So. 2d 695. (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The court stressed that the decision
was based on the facts of the case before it, and should not be taken as a broad interpreta-
tion of the controlling constitutional provision:
[T]his decision is limited to the facts, taxable years and circumstances of this par-
ticular case and should not be hailed as a precedent, providing "carte blanche"
approval of any tax levied on municipal property. The relationship between indi-
vidual cities and counties and the services provided by county agencies to munici-
pal residents will continue to change based upon development and expansion of
areas and programs. What has been proper for any given tax period is subject to
appropriate change and re-evaluation.
Id. at 701. See also, Burke v. Charlotte County, 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973) (county ordi-
nance authorizing levy of tax to provide for construction of roads in unincorporated areas of
the county nonetheless benefited municipal residents); City of Ormond Beach v. County of
Volusia, 383 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (countywide library system benefited
residents of municipality even though municipality operated its own public library).
90. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(6)(a) (1981).
91. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(6)(a) (1981) provides in pertinent part that counties may remit:
the identified cost of service paid from revenues required to be expended on a
countywide basis to the municipality or municipalities, within 6 months of the
adoption of the county budget, in the proportion that county ad valorem taxes
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Finally, any decision to create a special district may be made
only if it appears that a special district is the best alternative
available for delivering the service." If the special district is to
have a governing body other than that of the municipality or
county, the district must be amenable to separate special district
government." Judicial review of any special law or ordinance cre-
ating a special district is by certiorari."
C. Community Development Districts
In 1980 the Legislature enacted the Uniform Community Devel-
opment District Act,95 which substantially revised the provisions of
the New Communities Act of 1975." The general thrust of both
pieces of legislation was to provide a method for financing and
managing the construction, maintenance and operation of the ma-
jor infrastructures necessary for new communities." A central ele-
ment in the approach taken initially in 1975 was to grant to pri-
vate developers limited governmental status as a special
improvement district in order to operate and finance the cost, de-
livery, and maintenance of certain predevelopment capital im-
provements such as water, sewer, road and drainage systems and
other community facilities." The 1980 revision withdrew a few of
the sheep from the custody of the wolves, but retained the attri-
bute of providing exclusive procedures for the creation of special
districts which might carry out the purposes delineated in the
Act."
A "community development district" is a special district created
pursuant to the Act, limited to the performance of certain special-
ized functions enumerated in the Act, governed by an independent
body created, organized and constituted in the Act, and otherwise
subject to the provisions of the Act and general law pertaining to
collected within such municipality or municipalities bears to the total amount of
countywide ad valorem taxes collected by the county, or by any other method
prescribed by state law.
92. FLA. STAT. § 165.061(3) (1981).
93. Id. This requirement would not apply to a municipal service taxing or benefit unit
created pursuant to section 125.01(1)(q) since the governing body of such a unit is the board
of county commissioners. See FLA. STAT. § 125.01(2) (1981).
94. FLA. STAT. § 165.081 (1981).
95. 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 80-407 § 2, (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 190 (1981)).
96. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-204, (codified at FLA. STAT. ch: 163, Part V (1975)).
97. FLA. STAT. § 163.602 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 190.002 (1981).
98. FLA. STAT. § 163.602(3) (1975).
99. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 190.005(1), (2) (1981) with FLA. STAT. § 163.603 (1975).
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powers, accountability, requirements for disclosure, governing
body, formation, and termination. '00 The specialized functions re-
ferred to relate generally to water management, water and sewer
supply, bridges, roads, parks, fire prevention and control, security
and school buildings, street lights and mosquito control.'10
Two procedures are authorized for creating a community devel-
opment district. If the district is to cover 1000 acres or more, it
must be established by a rule adopted by the Florida Land and
Water Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act.' 02 The rule-making process is initiated by filing a
petition with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commis-
sion.10 The petition must contain a description of both the bound-
aries of the district and any real property within the boundaries
which is to be excluded from the district.' " The names and last
known addresses of owners of such excluded real property are to
be submitted along with the written consent to the establishment
of the district by the owners of all the real property to be included
in the district.'05 Alternatively, the petitioners may present docu-
mentation demonstrating that they control by deed, trust agree-
ment, contract or option all of the real property sought to be in-
cluded in the district. ' " The district is to be given a proposed
name and the petition must name five individuals who are to serve
as the initial board of supervisors.'1 A good faith estimate of the
time and cost needed to construct the proposed district services
100. FLA. STAT. § 190.003(6) (1981).
101. Id. § 190.012.
102. Id. § 190.005(l)(a).
The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission is created by FLA. STAT. § 380.07
and consists of the Administration Commission which, in turn, is created by FLA. STAT. §
14.202 and is composed of the Governor and Cabinet.
The Administrative Procedure Act is codified as FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1981).
103. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(a) (1981).
104. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(1).
105. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(1) & (2).
106. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(2).
107. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(3)-(4). Within 90 days following the effective date of the estab-
lishment of the district, the owners of real property in the district are required to meet for
the purpose of electing the members of the district's board of supervisors. Each landowner
is entitled to one vote per acre, and the five individuals receiving the highest number of
votes shall be elected initially for staggered terms of four years for two supervisors, and two
years for the remaining three supervisors. Thereafter, elections are to be held every two
years on the general election day, with the two candidates receiving the highest number of
votes cast being elected for a four-year term and the third for a two-year term. Id. §
190.006(2).
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must be submitted.108 The petition shall also contain a map of the
proposed district showing existing major trunk water mains and
sewer interceptors and outfalls.'0 e Finally, reference must be made
to the future land-use plan element of the local government's com-
prehensive plan, adopted pursuant to the Local Government Com-
prehensive Planning Act of 1975, designating the future general
distribution, location, and extent of public and private uses of land
proposed for the area within the district.'1
A public hearing on the petition must be held pursuant to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act."' The Florida
Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission must then consider the
record of the public hearing along with certain factors enumerated
in the statute and either grant or deny the petition for the estab-
lishment of the district."" The factors which the Commission must
consider are whether the statements in the petition are correct and
true, whether the creation of the district would be inconsistent
with either the state comprehensive plan or the local government
comprehensive plan, whether the proposed district is of an appro-
priate size and configuration to be developable as one functional
interrelated community, whether the district is the best alternative
available for providing the contemplated services and facilities
within the district, whether the district's proposed services and fa-
cilities will be compatible with existing local and regional services
and facilities, and whether the district is amenable to separate spe-
cial district government.' If the Commission grants the petition,
it must adopt a rule establishing the community development dis-
trict consistent with the provisions of the Uniform Community De-
velopment District Act."" The rule must name the district, the five
persons designated to be the initial members of the board of super-
visors and must describe the boundaries of the district as well as
any real property within those boundaries excluded from the
district."5
If the proposed district is less than 1000 acres, the exclusive
method for creating it is by an ordinance adopted by the board of
108. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(6).
109. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(5).
110. Id. § 190.005(1)(a)(7).The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,
1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-257, (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1981)).
111. FLA. STAT. § 190.005(1)(b) (1981).
112. Id. § 190.005(1)(c).
113. Id.




county commissioners of the county containing a majority of the
area of the proposed district."1 6 The ordinance is triggered by the
filing of a petition which must meet the same criteria described
above for the over-1000 acre district.1 Similarly, a public hearing
must be held,118 the board of county commissioners must consider
the same factors imposed upon the Florida Land and Water Adju-
dicatory Commission,11 9 and the ordinance establishing the com-
munity development district must conform with the requirements
of a rule for that purpose promulgated by the Commission.120
In the event all of the land in the proposed district is within the
territorial jurisdiction of a municipality, the petition requesting
the establishment of a district is to be submitted to that munici-
pality and the duties of the board of county commissioners de-
scribed above devolve upon the governing body of the
municipality. 2 '
If the proposed district is less than 1000 acres, either the county
or municipality which would have had jurisdiction to consider the
petition and establish the district by ordinance may transfer the
petition and its jurisdiction in the matter to the Florida Land and
Water Adjudicatory Commission.122 The transfer of a petition is
irrevocable and the Commission must consider the petition under
the same procedures which would have been followed if the district
had been within the Commission's jurisdiction initially. 2 8
The Legislature underscored its intention to provide the exclu-
sive method for creating special districts for the purposes deline-
ated in the Act by prohibiting the enactment of any special law
pertaining to the future creation of independent special districts
for any of the purposes set forth in the Act.'" The Florida Consti-
tution prohibits the enactment of any special law or general law of
local application pertaining to any subject which has been prohib-
ited by a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house, 2 5 and
this provision was specifically utilized in the enactment of the Uni-
116. Id. § 190.005(2).
117. Id. § 190.005(2)(a).
118. Id. § 190.005(2)(b).
119. Id. § 190.005(2)(c).
120. Id. § 190.005(2)(d).
121. Id. § 190.005(2)(e).
122. Id. § 190.005(2)(f).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 190.049.
125. FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 11(a)(21).
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form Community Development District Act.1"6
A special district created pursuant to the foregoing procedure is,
through its governing body (the board of supervisors)," 7 author-
ized to levy ad valorem taxes' 1 8 and to impose special assess-
ments129 pursuant to the procedures provided by general law. Ad
valorem taxes levied by the district are in addition to county, mu-
nicipal, or other ad valorem taxes provided for by law5 0 and must
"be approved by referendum when required by the State Constitu-
tion."181 Presumably this last provision refers to the requirement
that a special district may levy ad valorem taxes at a rate not to
exceed a millage which has been approved by a vote of the
electors.132
IV. TAXING POWER
A. Source of Power
A state possesses the inherent power to tax as an attribute or
characteristic of its sovereignty, limited only by the federal or state
constitutions. 3 A special district, however, operates from the op-
posite perspective. Although created by or under the authority of
the state to carry out a bona fide public purpose, a special district
has no inherent power to tax and may levy taxes only when ex-
pressly granted the power to do so.'" This fundamental concept is
underscored by the provision of the Florida Constitution that
"[nlo tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law." 133 The consti-
tution further acknowledges the legislative power to grant taxing
power to special districts in the section entitled "Local Taxes":
"[s]pecial districts may . . . be authorized by law to levy ad
126. 1980 Fla. Laws. ch. 80-407, § 4. The Act, introduced as HB 1776, received the requi-
site three-fifths vote in both the House, Fla. H.R. Jour. 1226 (Reg. Sess. 1980), and the
Senate, Fla. S. Jour. 1001 (Reg. Sess. 1980).
127. FLA. STAT. § 190.003(4), (1981).
128. Id. § 190.021.
129. Id. § 190.022.
130. Id. § 190,021(1). Apparently, such special districts do not therefore have to "share"
the county's ten mill cap pursuant to § 200.071 of the Florida Statutes. See infra note 256
and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 9(b). See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
133. Hunter v. Owens, 86 So. at 843; Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587, 610 (1874); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819).
134. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Amos, 115 So. 315, 320-21 (Fla. 1927), citing T. CooLEY,
THE LAW OF TAXATION § 130 (4th ed. 1924).
135. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a).
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valorem taxes and may be authorized by general law to levy other
taxes, for their respective purposes, except ad valorem taxes on in-
tangible personal property and taxes prohibited by this
constitution."Iss
The sovereign, legislative power to tax may be exercised through
a special district if it is limited as to the rate of levy or the amount
to be collected. 13 7 However, failure to duly limit a special district's
taxing power does not necessarily destroy the corporate entity or
legal functions of the district. 8
B. Special Assessments and User Fees Distinguished
Before exploring further the nature and extent of a special dis-
trict's power of taxation, it is important to distinguish two other
sources of revenue which a special district might have. The first of
these is the power to impose a fee or a charge either for the use of
property belonging to the special district or for a service provided
by the special district. Quite simply, such a fee or charge is not a
tax."' A tax is defined as "an enforced burden of contribution im-
posed by sovereign right for the support of the government, the
administration of the law, and to execute the various functions the
sovereign is called on to perform." 4 A charge voluntarily incurred
by using certain public property, such as the payment of a toll for
the privilege of driving an automobile across a bridge, does not
constitute the payment of a tax. This holds true even where the
total amount of funds collected exceeds the amount necessary to
pay for the construction of the bridge and thereafter is used to
defray other expenses of the governmental entity which owns and
operates the bridge."'
Secondly, charges in the nature of special assessments are to be
distinguished from taxes:
A "special assessment" is like a tax in that it is an enforced
contribution from the property owner, it may possess other points
of similarity to a tax, but it is inherently different and governed
136. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a).
137. Merriman v. Hutchinson, 116 So. 271 (Fla. 1928); Stewart v. Daytona and New
Smyrna Inlet Dist., 114 So. 545, 547 (Fla. 1927).
138. State ex rel. Davis v. Ryan, 158 So. 62, 69 (Fla. 1934).
139. State ex rel. Watson v. Caldwell, 23 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1945); Masters v. Duval
County, 154 So. 172, 174 (Fla. 1934). Nor is it a "special assessment." Day v. City of St.
Augustine, 139 So. 880, 885 (Fla. 1932).
140. Klemm v. Davenport, 129 So. 904, 907 (Fla. 1930) (emphasis added).
141. State ex rel. Landis v. Duval County, 141 So. 173, 175 (Fla. 1932).
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by entirely different principles. It is imposed upon the theory
that that portion of the community which is required to bear it
receives some special or peculiar benefit in the enhancement of
value of the property against which it is imposed as a result of the
improvement made with the proceeds of the special assessment.
It is limited to the property benefited, is not governed by uni-
formity, and may be determined legislatively or judicially. " "
The source of the power to impose a special assessment is the
same as the source of the power to levy a tax: the inherent sover-
eign power of the state.""3 The distinction between a special assess-
ment and a tax is often blurred because the Legislature provides
that the procedures used to assess and collect special assessments
are the same procedures authorized to assess and collect general
taxes,4 the general public perceives special assessments as taxes,
and special assessments are commonly referred to as taxes.'4 5
The distinguishing feature is the nexus between the particular
service or facility to be funded by the special assessment and the
benefit flowing therefrom to the property or persons required to
pay it. Any exercise of the power of taxation must be to further a
public purpose and for the benefit of the property or residents
within the taxing jurisdiction. '6 However, where the levy imposed
is a tax in the broader, more general sense, the benefit to a particu-
lar person or property need not be demonstrated. Instead, only a
benefit to the public in general need be shown.1 47 Indeed, the pen-
dulum may swing too far in the other direction: if the tax is im-
posed only within a limited area but is for a purpose which will
benefit persons or property lying far beyond the taxed jurisdiction,
such a general tax may be held invalid. 48 However, if the levy is a
special assessment, that "peculiar species of taxation,"' 49 there
must be a demonstrable benefit to the property assessed. The ben-
efit must be something more than the benefit the community at
142. 129 So. at 907. See generally, C.H. HAILTON, THE LAW OF TAXATION BY SPECIAL
ASsESSMENTS (1907).
143. 139 So. at 885; Anderson v. City of Ocala, 91 So. 182, 186 (Fla. 1921).
144. City of Naples v. Moon, 269 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1972); Roesch v. State ex rel.
Wyman, 56 So. 562, 563 (Fla. 1911).
145. 139 So. at 885; Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. Lake Worth Inlet Dist., 161 So. 717, 719
(Fla. 1935). See St. Lucie County-Fort Pierce Fire Prevention and Control Dist. v. Higgs,
141 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1962), for a discussion of chapter 59-1086 of the Laws of Florida.
146. Smith v. Lummus, 6 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1942).
147. Blake v. City of Tampa, 156 So. 97 (Fla. 1934).
148. State ex rel. Milton v. Dickenson, 33 So. 514 (Fla. 1902).
149. Lainhart v. Catts, 75 So. 47, 52 (Fla. 1917).
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large might receive; 150 the market or utility value of the property
must be enhanced.15 The cost of the improvement is then allo-
cated among the properties which have been benefited in accor-
dance with the relative degree of benefit each parcel has re-
ceived,152 and the assessment imposed on any particular parcel
may not exceed the value of the benefit it has received. 153
The distinction drawn between a special assessment and a gen-
eral tax is important also in the determination of whether the
homestead exemption applies to the levy in question. The constitu-
tion provides:
Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate
and maintains thereon the permanent residence of the owner, or
another legally or naturally dependent upon the owner, shall be
exempt from taxation thereon, except assessments for special
benefits, up to the assessed valuation of five thousand dollars,
upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by
law.' "
In an early interpretation of the predecessor to this provision,15 5
the exemption was held not to apply in the case of a levy for the
maintenance, upkeep, salaries and other incidentals of a hospital
district and two special road and bridge districts. 56 In the first de-
cision construing the language used in the present constitution, the
court went to some length to explore the distinction between an
assessment for special benefits and an ad valorem tax:
The typical ad valorem levy is the annual imposition for the
150. City of Ft. Myers v. State, 117 So. 97, 104 (Fla. 1928).
151. Crowder v. Phillips, 1 So. 2d 629, 630-31 (Fla. 1941).
152. Davis v. City of Clearwater, 139 So. 825, 827 (Fla. 1932).
153. Summerland, Inc. v. City of Punta Gorda, 134 So. 611, 613 (Fla. 1931).
154. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (emphasis added). By amendment adopted in 1979, see
Fla. SJR l-B, (Spec. Session 1979), authority was granted to the Legislature to provide by
general law for the increase of the amount of assessed valuation to be exempt from taxation.
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(c). This has been implemented and the amount of assessed value
exempt from each levy, other than that of school districts, was $15,000 in 1980, $20,000 in
1981, and will be $25,000 in 1982 and each year thereafter. Id. art. VII, § 6(d).
155. The amendment to the 1885 constitution which first provided for the homestead
exemption was adopted in 1934 and excluded "special assessments for benefits." By further
amendment in 1938 the phrase was changed to "assessments for special benefits," the same
language which is presently in effect. In Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572,
576 (Fla. 1956) the distinction was not explored, but in State v. Halifax Hospital Dist., 159
So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963) the court opined that the new language "was much more restrictive."
Id. at 234.
156. State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Dreka, 185 So. 616, 617 (Fla. 1938).
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operation of the government the amount of which is measured by
the budget adopted, the assessed valuation of taxable property
and the levy (usually in mills) against the taxable property suffi-
cient to produce the amount necessary to meet the budget. The
ad valorem tax on a particular parcel is apt to vary from year to
year and it will fluctuate annually in proportion to changes in as-
sessed valuation or the amount of the millage.
An "assessment for special benefits" on the other hand is cus-
tomarily a fixed amount assessed against a particular parcel of
land arrived at by totaling the cost of a public improvement and
apportioning it against abutting property specially benefited usu-
ally on a front foot or acreage basis without regard to ad valorem
valuation of the land. While it is most often payable in annual
installments, the amount of such installments is usually fixed at
the time the initial levy is made and they do not fluctuate from
year to year as the result of changes in ad valorem valuation or
increases in the cost of maintaining the improvement. 17
Therefore, it was held that a financing device designed to retire
improvement bonds, to pay interest and to operate the improve-
ments was invalid because it was not an "assessment for special
benefits" and yet had been specifically imposed on homesteads.5 8
The federal income tax law also recognizes the distinction be-
tween general taxation and special assessments. Generally, there is
a deduction for state and local real property taxes.159 However, de-
ductions are specifically disallowed for "[taxes assessed against lo-
cal benefits of a kind tending to increase the value of the property
assessed."' 160 This is in keeping with the notion that expenditures
which are for improvements to property are capital in nature and
may not be deducted."' A deduction is allowed, however, for that
portion of a special assessment which is allocable to interest or
maintenance charges since they do not partake of the capital ex-
penditure nature of the special assessment.16 2
For federal income tax purposes, a non-deductible special assess-
157. Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d at 579.
158. Id. Accord, State v. Halifax Hospital Dist., 159 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1963); and Crowder
v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 428, aff'd on rehearing, 1 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1941).
159. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
160. Id. § 164(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4.
161. I.R.C. § 263; Noble v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 916 (1978). However, an assessment
has been held to be deductible upon a finding that it was for the purpose of repairing and
resurfacing streets, not to widen or lengthen them. First Nat'l Bank of Enid v. Hinds, 48
A.F.T.R. 1982 (W.D. Okla. 1955).
162. I.R.C. § 164(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4(b).
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ment is added to the basis of the benefited property.16" However,
even if the property is otherwise subject to the allowance for de-
preciation, the expenditure may not be recovered by that means.,"
The depreciation deduction is authorized with reference to prop-
erty which is "used in" the taxpayer's trade or business.1" While a
special assessment is an improvement which has benefited the tax-
payer's property, it does so only indirectly. For example, while
paving a street in front of the business premises of a taxpayer may
increase the utility and market value of that business premises
thereby benefiting the taxpayer's property, the paved street does
not become part of the business premises."" Further, the taxpayer
must have some economic ownership of the property with respect
to which a depreciation deduction is being sought 16 7 and, of course,
he would have none over the now-paved public street. As it has
been succinctly stated:
A taxpayer upon whom a special assessment is levied for the
construction of a pavement has no peculiar financial interest in
that pavement. It is as much the property of the public and whol-
ly so as is any public building .... It is not the theory of special
assessments that the taxpayer acquires in compensation for what
he has paid a special interest in that which is constructed. The
theory is that he is compensated by a value added to what he
already had. The increased value of his property will diminish as
the value of the pavement decreases from exhaustion, wear, and
tear, but the increase in value which the taxpayer has received,
while it diminishes, does not diminish by reason of its exhaustion,
wear and tear, but by reason of the exhaustion, wear and tear of
property in which the taxpayer has no special pecuniary interest
and on account of whose exhaustion, wear and tear the taxpayer
is entitled to no deduction.'"
163. National Lumber & Tie Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1937). See BNA
Tax Management Portfolio 62-5th, "Depreciation-Basis, Useful Life, Salvage," A-31
(1980).
164. F.M. Hubbell Son & Co. v. Burnet, 51 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1931). See BNA Tax
Management Portfolio 24-4th, "State, Local and Federal Taxes," A-6 (1979).
165. I.R.C. § 167.
166. F.M. Hubbell Son & Co. v. Burnet, 51 F.2d at 645.
167. Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 337 (1929).
168. F.M. Hubbell Son & Co. v. Burnet, 51 F.2d at 645.
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C. Ad Valorem Taxes
1. Public Purpose
Special districts are constitutionally authorized to levy ad
valorem taxes, and other types of taxes if authorized to do so by
general law.169 This second grant of authority has not been imple-
mented by the Legislature, therefore discussion of the taxing
power of special districts will focus exclusively on ad valorem
taxation.
The fundamental principle underlying the power to tax is that
because it is derived from the inherent sovereign power of the state
it may be properly exercised only for a public purpose.170 The pur-
pose of the tax may be to raise revenue, or it may have a regula-
tory aspect, or both.171 The concept of a public purpose is broad
and is generally held to be present whenever there is a promotion
of the public health, safety, morals, welfare, security, prosperity
and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given
jurisdiction.172 What is prohibited. is a tax that is levied for merely
private purposes.1 78 This does not mean, however, that some pri-
vate property may not receive some benefit greater than that re-
ceived by other private property, if the private benefit is incidental
to the public purpose served.17 4 Conversely, the incidental advan-
tage to the public which might result from public aid to a private
project does not make it a public purpose.'
The question of what is or is not a public purpose is a legal ques-
169. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a).
170. Burnett v. Greene, 122 So. 570, 577 (Fla. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 144 So. 205
(Fla. 1932); Getzen v. Sumter County, 103 So. 104, 106 (Fla. 1925). Reliance has also been
placed on the concept that if the tax were not levied for a public purpose, it would consti-
tute the taking of private property without just compensation, in violation of the United
States and Florida Constitutions. U.S. CONST. art. X, § 6(a). See State ex rel. Davis v. City
of Stuart, 120 So. 335 (Fla. 1929).
171. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 189 (1900); Jerome H. Sheip Co. v. Amos, 130
So. 699, 705 (Fla. 1930).
172. Lott v. City of Orlando, 196 So. 313, 315 (Fla. 1939); C.V. Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida
Citrus Comm'n, 175 So. 248, 253 (Fla. 1937).
173. See Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); City of Daytona Beach v. King, 181 So. 1,
5 (Fla. 1938); Stockton v. Powell, 10 So. 688, 690 (Fla. 1892). The Florida Constitution ech-
oes this sentiment by prohibiting all state and local governmental entities from lending or
,using their taxing power to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person, with
certain enumerated exceptions which have a "public purpose" flavor such as electrical en-
ergy generating, transmission facilities or airports. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
174. Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1966).
175. Id.; City of Daytona Beach v. King, 181 So. at 5.
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tion. 17 Nonetheless, the judiciary has shown a large degree of def-
erence to a legislative declaration of public purpose,1" considering
such a declaration to be persuasive, but not conclusive.178
2. Benefits
An essential element of the public purpose doctrine is that there
must be some demonstrable benefit to the public derived from the
tax. Historically, a further refinement of that concept required that
the benefits flow primarily to the members of the public subject to
the tax.1 79 General taxes, as opposed to special assessments, are
upheld as a valid exercise of governmental power on the theory
that they provide some general benefit to the people resulting from
governmental protection to persons and property, as well as ser-
vices such as roads and schools which have the welfare or protec-
tion of all within the jurisdiction taxed as their object.180 There
exists, in effect, a presumption that benefits of a general nature
flow from the exercise of the general taxing power of a state,1 81
municipality,182 county 83 school district,1 8 4 or special district. 185
However, the presumption is not conclusive. If the tax is imposed
to provide financing for a particular public facility, not for ordi-
nary governmental purposes or to conserve the public safety,
peace, health or morals, then property subject to the tax must be
benefited in some substantial or appreciable way.1 8 6 If the tax is
levied by a local governmental entity, such as a municipality, for
general governmental purposes, the standard is less rigid; yet such
a tax, although general in nature, is also local. Thus including
property within the jurisdiction of a municipality or a special dis-
trict and subjecting it to the general ad valorem taxing power of
the jurisdiction is improper if the land is entirely beyond the range
of the local benefits and could not conceivably be benefited.8 7
176. City of Daytona Beach v. King, 181 So. at 5.
177. State v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 216 So. 2d 202, 205 (Fla. 1968).
178. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 785 (Fla. 1952).
179. State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 348 (Fla. 1929).
180. Blake v. City of Tampa, 156 So. 97, 99 (Fla. 1934).
181. 120 So. at 349.
182. Id.
183. Dressel v. Dade County, 219 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969), afl'd, 226 So.
2d 402 (Fla. 1969).
184. Malounek v. Highfil, 131 So. 313 (Fla. 1930).
185. Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1978).
186. Consolidated Land Co. v. Tyler, 101 So. 280, 282 (Fla. 1924).
187. 120 So. at 348. See also City of Winter Haven v. A.M. Klemm & Son, 192 So. 646,
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A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court has brought the
efficacy of the benefit doctrine into question. At issue in Tucker v.
Underdown'" was the validity of county ordinances which, pursu-
ant to general law authorization,189 had created six special dis-
tricts.1 90 Five of the districts were to provide the municipal service
of street lighting in geographical areas embracing less than the en-
tire unincorporated area of the county; the sixth was to provide a
solid waste disposal facility for the entire unincorporated area of
the county. 191 The plaintiffs, owners of real property in the special
districts, asserted that the districts were invalid, inter alia, be-
cause much of the property included within the various districts
was "not benefited in a real or substantial way by the services pro-
vided."1 9 The court made no analysis of whether the proposed tax
levies were for providing "ordinary governmental purposes, or to
conserve the public safety, peace, health, . . . [or] for a public fa-
cility."193 The answer to the plaintiffs' contention was simply that
because "the governing constitutional provisions and statutes re-
quire no consideration of direct 'benefit' as a basis for taxation...
no benefit-tax nexus is otherwise required."1 9" A footnote to the
opinion which followed immediately after the above quoted pas-
sage stated "We do not address appellants' assertion that the re-
cord does not support a factual finding of benefit to certain tax-
payers in the several municipal service taxing units. A finding one
way or the other on this point is simply irrelevent to the
proceeding.'"
Curiously, the only authority cited by the Tucker court for its
holding that the benefit doctrine is irrelevent was Dressler v. Dade
County."" Dressler involved a levy of ad valorem taxes by Dade
County for the purpose of providing fire protection. The plaintiffs
651 (Fla. 1939): "[Llands may [not] be taxed for public municipal purposes when they are
not needed for any present, potential or reasonably anticipated lawful municipal purpose
and cannot receive any benefit whatever in return for taxation for municipal governmental
or public improvement purposes."
188. 356 So. 2d 251.
189. FLA. STAT. §§ 125.01(1)(q), (r); 200.071(3) (1975).
190. The districts were denominated "municipal service taxing or benefit units" by FLA.
STAT. § 125.01(1)(q). The validity of this statute was upheld in Gallant v. Stephens, 358 So.
2d 536 (Fla. 1978).
191. Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d at 253.
192. Id.
193. Consolidated Land Co. v. Tyler, 101 So. at 282.
194. 356 So. 2d at 253.
195. Id. at n.8.
196. Dressel v. Dade County, 219 So. 2d 716.
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alleged that because certain municipalities within Dade County
furnished their own fire protection, it was improper for the county
to collect ad valorem taxes for the same purpose within those mu-
nicipalities which did not receive any benefit from the county
levy. 197 The trial judge, however, whose opinion was adopted by
the appellate court, made a finding of fact that a "minor but very
significant portion of the County's fire protection budget is ex-
pended on certain county-wide services provided to municipalities
with organized fire departments and to all other governmental en-
tities within the County." 198 There followed an enumeration of
some nine specific services which the county fire protection budget
provided countywide. The court thereafter arrived at the conclu-
sion of law that property within the relevant municipalities re-
ceived lesser benefits from the county fire department than did
property in unincorporated areas or municipalities without their
own fire departments, and there was therefore an inequality in the
benefits received.1 99 Nonetheless, the levy was sustained on the
ground that it was in the nature of a general tax levy:
Since the prevention and control of fire in all parts of the
County serves the general good and is a community or govern-
mental purpose, and consistent with the concept of public health,
welfare and safety, the Court deems the County's method of tax-
ing all property in the County on an ad valorem basis for the gen-
eral community benefit to be valid, even if a greater portion of
the benefits inure to residents of the unincorporated areas and
certain municipalities. 00
In short, Dressler does not stand for the proposition that there
need be no demonstrable benefit in order to support a general tax
levy. Indeed, the court went to great lengths to describe the bene-
fits that were provided countywide. It would seem, therefore, that
the court's holding in Tucker should be confined to the limited
circumstances of "municipal service taxing or benefit units," 01
which were the peculiar form of special districts before the court.
Municipal service taxing or benefit units were authorized by the
Legislature in implementation of, inter alia, the provision added to
the constitution by the 1968 revision that "[p]roperty situate
197. Id. at 717.
198. Id. at 718.
199. Id. at 719.
200. Id. at 720.
201. Authorized and created pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q) (1981).
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within municipalities shall not be subject to taxation for services
rendered by the county exclusively for the benefit of the property
or residents in unincorporated areas."2021 Thus, the law seems still
to be that a municipality may not have its boundaries and jurisdic-
tion to levy ad valorem taxes extended to such a degree that it will
encompass land which cannot receive any benefit whatever in re-
turn for taxation for municipal government.2 03 Nor may the bound-
aries of a special district other than a "municipal service taxing or
benefit unit" be extended to cover property which cannot conceiv-
ably be benefited.'" However a county, when operating as its alter
ego in only the unincorporated areas as a "municipal service taxing
or benefit unit," may subject property therein to ad valorem taxa-
tion for municipal (local) services regardless of benefit or lack
thereof.2 0 5 Although this seems to be the resting place of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, with its myopic eye on Florida's statutes and
constitution, it would seem that circumstances might arise where
the lack of benefit is clearly demonstrable. Such a situation may
well violate the federal constitutional premise of the benefit doc-
trine, viz., that a tax in such circumstances would constitute the
taking of private property without just compensation .2 " A more
reasonable approach for a county to take in establishing municipal
service taxing or benefit units is to mold them to the portions of
the unincorporated areas of the county which reasonably will be
benefited by the services or facilities to be provided by the munici-
pal service taxing or benefit unit. Although the Florida courts have
sanctioned the establishment of single municipal service taxing or
benefit units to provide multiple services or facilities throughout
all of the unincorporated area of various counties, °7 they have
202. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(h).
203. City of Winter Haven v. A.M. Klemm & Son, 192 So. at 651; State ex rel. Attorney
General v. City of Avon Park, 149 So. 409, 414 (Fla. 1933). See supra note 187 and accompa-
nying text.
204. State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 120 So. at 348.
205. Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d 251; accord Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. v.
County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
206. State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 120 So. at 350; State ex rel. Attorney General
v. City of Avon Park, 149 So. at 415-16; U.S. CONST. amend. V. But see Hudson Pulp &
Paper Corp. v. County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44.
207. Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d 251 (a municipal service taxing unit to provide
solid waste disposal encompassed the entire unincorporated area of Broward County); Gal-
lant v. Stephens, 358 So. 2d 536 (a single municipal service taxing unit to provide road
repair, fire protection, law enforcement, recreation, garbage collection and disposal, and sew-
age collection encompassed the entire unincorporated area of Pinellas County); Hudson
Pulp & Paper Corp. v. County of Volusia, 348 So. 2d 44 (a single municipal service taxing
unit to provide for the maintenance, resurfacing and construction of roads, municipal-type
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done so without a careful analysis of the relevant principals of or-
ganic law.
The concept of establishing some nexus between property lo-
cated within municipalities which is subject to county ad valorem
taxation and benefits returned thereto was introduced to the 'Flor-
ida Constitution with the 1968 revision in an attempt to alleviate
what the drafters perceived as "double taxation."208 The constitu-
tional proscription against taxing property located within a munic-
ipality for services rendered by the county "exclusively" for the
benefit of those in the unincorporated areas was interpreted in an
early decision to prohibit taxation by the county only where "no
real or substantial benefit" flowed to the property within the mu-
nicipality from those services.2 09
There have been two other important decisions construing this
provision of the Florida Constitution. In 1976 the Florida Supreme
Court held that the provisions of article VIII § 1(h) of the Florida
Constitution are self-executing.210 "The mandate against city taxa-
tion for exclusive county activities is absolute and unequivocal,"2 1 1
and therefore it is not necessary for the Legislature to enumerate
various services which might be within the purview of the provi-
sion, or otherwise clarify its scope. The case was remanded to the
trial court with directions for that court to "exercise its inherent
equitable powers to fashion a suitable remedy. 1 1 2 In 1978 the pro-
vision was construed to apply only to ad valorem property taxes.1
police patrol and service, water supply and distribution, sewerage collection and treatment,
solid waste collection, and fire protection encompassed the entire unincorporated area of
Volusia County).
208. City of St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d at 822.
209. Id. at 823. See supra note 89. In Alsdorf v. Broward County, 373 So. 2d 695 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) the appellate court upheld a determination of the trial judge that a
countywide public library system provided real and substantial benefits to all county re-
sidents, including those residing in a municipality which had its own public library system.
The financing of Volusia County's public library system by countywide ad valorem taxation
was upheld on similar reasoning in City of Ormond Beach v. County of Volusia, 383 So. 2d
671 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Likewise, the levy of countywide ad valorem taxes for the
construction and repair of roads and canals in the unincorporated areas of a county was
held to provide sufficient benefits to municipal residents to pass the Briley test in Burke v.
Charlotte County, 286 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1973).
210. Alsdorf v. Broward County, 333 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1976).
211. Id. at 459.
212. Id. at 460.
213. Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 1978). The
court recognized the conundrum it had created:
We hold that Article VIII, Section 1(h) applies only to property taxation. We
are aware of the possibility that with this holding, counties may use revenues not
derived from property taxation exclusively for projects benefiting residents and
19821
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The role of municipal service taxing or benefit units and other spe-
cial districts in supplying an avenue for relief from "double taxa-
tion" and compliance with article VIII, § 1(h) is expected to be a
central one.214
3. Uniformity
The Florida Constitution requires that "[aill ad valorem taxa-
tion shall be at a uniform rate within each taxing unit."2 15 The
predecessor to this provision provided that "[tihe Legislature shall
provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation."216 The removal
of the "and equal" phrase is not thought to have repealed the
equality in taxation concept as a constitutional requirement, but
merely to have replaced and clarified it with the "within each tax-
ing unit" language.21 7 The concept of "equality," as it pertains to
the levy of ad valorem taxes by special districts, refers to the tax
being imposed equally on all like property similarly situated.1 8
Thus, in practice, it involves consideration of whether property
subject to the tax has been properly valued,219 whether property
property in unincorporated areas causing a serious imbalance in benefits received
between county and municipal property owners and residents. The Legislature
must address this possibility.
Id. at 148.
214. In order to relieve municipal property from the burden of countywide ad valorem
taxation which was found to provide no real or substantial benefit to such property, the trial
court ordered the defendant counties to create municipal service taxing units in Sarasota
County v. Town of Longboat Key, 375 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1979) and Manatee County v. Town
of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1978).
215. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 2. Ad valorem taxes imposed on intangible personal property
are excepted; however, this exception is not pertinent to our consideration of special dis-
tricts because counties, school districts, municipalities, and special districts are prohibited
from levying ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property by article VII, § 9(a), of the
Florida Constitution.
216. FLA, CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1885).
217. Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 430 (Fla. 1975); citing "Commentary" to Article
7, 26A FLA. STAT. ANN. For a discussion of the 1885 constitutional provision see State ex rel.
Maxwell Hunter, Inc. v. O'Quinn, 154 So. 166, 168 (Fla. 1934). In Town of Palm Beach v.
City of West Palm Beach, 55 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1951), ad valorem taxes to finance a special
district encompassing two municipalities were levied at different rates by the two municipal-
ities. The court held this arrangement did not violate the "uniform and equal" requirement
so long as each rate was uniformly applied within each municipality.
218. For a discussion of the equality concept, see infra notes 235-55 and accompanying
text.
219. Schooley v. Sunset Realty Corp., 185 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). All
property is to be assessed at its "just valuation;" however, the Legislature may provide ex-
ceptions for the following classifications of property: agricultural land, land used exclusively
for non-commercial recreational purposes, tangible personal property held for sale as stock
in trade, and livestock. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
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has been improperly omitted from the tax roll201 or improperly
granted exemption from the tax.221 If such conditions are found to
exist, they violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.2 "2
The uniformity requirement was interpreted to require that the
rate of tax levied by a taxing unit be uniform within the unit im-
posing the tax.22 8 The requirement that taxes be levied uniformly
within a taxing unit is in keeping with the concept that taxes lev-
ied by a county, for example, must be for a county purpose.2 24
Thus, the burden of providing a benefit equally available to all
within the county should be borne equally by all within the
county.2 25
More recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court changed the
perspective from which to view the uniformity requirement.22' At
issue was a county plan to create municipal service taxing units
within the unicorporated areas of the county and to authorize
them to levy ad valorem taxes within the respective unit without
referendum approval by the resident electors. The constitutional
provision granting counties, municipalities and school districts ad
valorem taxing power at a rate not to exceed ten mills for their
respective purposes provided the basis on which the referendum
issue was raised. 27 This same provision permits special districts to
levy ad valorem taxes only when authorized by law, and if so au-
thorized, not to levy in excess of "a millage authorized by law ap-
proved by vote of the electors. 2 2 8 This issue was resolved by look-
ing to the next sentence in the same section of the constitution: "A
county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized
by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal
220. Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 186 So. 679 (Fla. 1939).
221. See Lykes Bros., Inc. v. City of Plant City, 354 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1978).
222. E.g., Arundel Corp. v. Sproul, 186 So. at 681-82.
223. Considering the 1885 Florida Constitution, the court in State ex rel. Maxwell
Hunter, Inc. v. O'Quinn, 154 So. at 168 held:
The rates of state taxation must be equal and uniform throughout the entire
state, though the rates of tax levies for county purposes may be different in the
several counties, each county being a separate taxing unit. . . . Section 1 of arti-
cle 9 requires "a uniform and equal rate of taxation" in each taxing unit whether
state or county ....
Accord, Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, 55 So. 2d at 571. See generally,
T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATiON §§ 310-29 (4th ed. 1924).
224. Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 322 (Fla. 1930).
225. See State ex rel. Milton v. Dickenson, 44 Fla. 623 (1902) (statute requiring the
counties to provide facilities for the state militia, a state purpose, held unconstitutional).
226. Gallant v. Stephens, 358 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1978).
227. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 9.
228. Id. § 9(b).
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purposes." '' The amalgamation of these provisions, the court
held, provided a method for allowing counties to impose ad
valorem taxes not only for county services provided, but also for
municipal services provided by the county within the unincorpo-
rated areas. Thus the ad valorem taxes levied for the municipal
service taxing unit were not subject to the referendum
requirement.
The effect of the holding in Gallant is that a municipal service
taxing or benefit unit is not a "special district" as that term is used
in article VII, § 9(b).2 30 The unit imposing the tax is the county.
Having decided that, the court turned its attention to the uniform-
ity requirement. There, in order to be consistent, the court was
forced to construe the provision, not by looking at the unit which
has the power and is levying the tax to determine whether it is
being imposed uniformly within its jurisdiction, but by:
viewing the uniformity clause as applying to the objects of taxa-
tion-the subjects within the unit actually being taxed-rather
than to the taxing authority itself. [The appellees] suggest that a
tax for Pinellas County's municipal taxing service unit is uniform
within the "taxing unit"-that is, the unincorporated area-and
they support this view by reference to Article VIII, Section 1(h)
of the Constitution and our decision in Alsdorf v. Broward
County. Together these authorities require a lower county-im-
posed tax rate in municipalities which receive no substantial ben-
efit from the services provided by the tax revenue, thereby de-
stroying uniformity within the county notwithstanding that the
tax is "county" imposed.8 1
Unfortunately, this seems to be an unwarranted extrapolation
from the cited Alsdorf case. The constitutional provision at issue
there232 was a prohibition against property located within a munic-
ipality being subject to ad valorem taxation by a county in order to
provide services or facilities which were of no real or substantial
benefit to such property. The Alsdorf case simply construed the
229. Id.
230. Without exploration of the proper definition of a "special district" as that term is
used in article VII, § 9(b), and without further elaboration, the court merely observed in a
footnote: "Statutes have defined special districts as local units of special government (ex-
cluding school districts) created by authority of general or special law for the purpose of
performing specialized functions within limited boundaries. §§ 165.031(5) and 218.31(5),
FLA. STAT. (1975)." Gallant v. Stevens, 358 So. 2d at 540, n.11.
231. Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
232. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(h). See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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provision as being self-executing; it did not impose the remedy
suggested in Gallant of having the county levy ad valorem taxes on
a non-uniform basis within the county.2 " Other alternatives were
available which would have provided compliance with both article
VIII, § 1(h) and article VII, § 2. For example, the services which
did not benefit the municipalities could have been paid for by user
fees, or from county tax revenues other than from ad valorem taxa-
tion.23 4 Alternately, a special district could have been created en-
compassing the area which would benefit from the services with
authorization to levy ad valorem taxes not in excess of a millage
approved by a vote of the resident electors.
4. Equality
The concept of equality in ad valorem taxation requires that the
tax be levied at the same rate, expressed as a millage or one-hun-
dredth of a cent per dollar of assessed valuation, 35 on all property
within the jurisdiction subject to the tax.23 6 All property is to be
assessed for purposes of ad valorem taxation at its "just valua-
tion."237 While it is a simple matter to achieve the appearance of
233. 333 So. 2d at 460.
234. See Manatee County v. Town of Longboat Key, 365 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 1978);
City of Hialeah Gardens v. Dade County, 348 So. 2d 1174, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
235. FLA. STAT. § 200.191(5) (1981) requires that when millage rates are published for
the purpose of giving public notice, they must be expressed in terms of dollars and cents per
every thousand dollars of assessed property value.
236. Town of Palm Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, 55 So. 2d 566, 571 (Fla. 1951).
See generally T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION §§ 290-94 (4th ed. 1924).
237. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. The predecessor of this provision has been construed to
equate "just valuation" with "fair market value." This figure is determined as the amount
which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy would pay for property to one willing but
not obliged to sell. Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81, 85-86 (Fla. 1965).
The Legislature has provided property appraisers with a list of eight factors which must
be considered in arriving at the just valuation of property:
(1) the present cash value;
(2) "[tjhe highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be
put in the immediate future and the present use of the property," taking into
consideration any governmental moratorium which might restrict or prohibit de-
velopment or improvement of the property;
(3) its location;
(4) the quantity or size of the property;
(5) its cost and the replacement value of any improvements;
(6) its condition;
(7) the income from the property; and
(8) the net proceeds the owner might derive from the sale of the property.
FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1981).
The property appraiser must consider each factor in making his assessment, but the
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equality by imposing the tax at a single millage rate, equality will
be lacking if the various properties subject to the millage rate have
not all been assessed at their full fair market values. Property own-
ers within a county have, on occasion, been able to demonstrate
that even though the county imposed its ad valorem tax at a single
rate, the assessed value of their property was a greater percentage
of just value than the assessed value of other property. Therefore,
the resulting tax burden had been unequally imposed.2 88
In Florida, property is valued, or assessed, for ad valorem tax
purposes by the property appraiser for each county.2 3 Municipali-
ties located within a county levy their ad valorem taxes on the ba-
sis of an assessment roll prepared by the county property ap-
praiser. The tax roll, therefore, reflects the same assessed valuation
for any particular parcel as its assessed valuation on the county
assessment roll.2 40 Similarly, school districts 41 and special dis-
tricts, including municipal service taxing or benefit units, located
within the county, utilize the same assessed values for levying their
ad valorem taxes.4 2 Issues of equality of assessment are usually
confined to the integrity of the tax roll of a single county. When a
special district encompasses property located in two or more coun-
ties, an additional opportunity to prove inequality is provided. De-
spite the constitutional mandate, it has long been recognized in
Florida that the general level of assessed valuations of property,
expressed as a percentage of full fair market value, varies from
county to county. 43 Some property appraisers have the resources
and expertise to do a better job of valuing the property in their
counties than others. If a special district has jurisdiction over
property located in adjacent counties which have different general
weight accorded to each factor is within his discretion. Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368,
371 (Fla. 1977); Atlantic Int'l Inv. Corp. v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 919, 921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980). Failure to consider one of the factors renders the assessment invalid. Palm
Corp. v. Homer, 261 So. 2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 1972).
238. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Dade, 275 So..2d 4 (Fla. 1973); Dade
County v. Salter, 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1966). For a general discussion of the valuation of
property for ad valorem taxation, see 31 FLA. JUR. Taxation §§ 334-51 (1974).
239. The constitution provides for the election, for a term of four years, of a property
appraiser for each county. Fla. Const. art. VIII, § 1(d).
240. FLA. STAT. § 193.116(1) (1981). Likewise, the county tax collector is charged with
the duty of collecting all ad valorem taxes for municipalities within his county. Id. §
193.116(2).
241. FLA. STAT. §§ 200.065, 237.091 (1981).
242. Id. §§ 193.114, 200.011.
243. See Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1976); District School Bd. v. Askew,
278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973).
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levels of assessment, then property located in the counties would
bear an unequal tax burden.2" This issue was raised in Dickinson
v. Bell, where the plaintiffs sought to prevent the approval of the
assessment rolls of the counties encompassed by the Central and
South Florida Flood Control District because of unequal valuations
of property among the counties.2 5 The district court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the Comptroller failed to satisfactorily su-
pervise the preparation of assessment rolls by the property ap-
praisers in order to ensure uniform and equal valuation. The
Comptroller later was ordered to make his own determination of
the values of property of the same classification as the plaintiffs'
(grazing lands) and to institute proceedings to require the property
appraisers to properly assess the land.24
244. For example, if one county had a general level of assessment at 70% of just value,
and the other county had an assesment at 90%, and the special district imposed a tax of one
mill, property in the first county with a fair market value of $10,000 would owe a tax of $7;
property in the second county with the same fair market value would owe a tax of $9. The
example assumes the assessed value of the property is fully taxable with no exemptions
applicable.
245. 214 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See also Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d
594, 596 (Fla. 1966).
246. Department of Revenue v. Bell, 227 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
In Straughn v. GAC Properties, Inc., 360 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978), the taxpayer alleged
inequality as a result of portions of a contiguous parcel of property which was assessed at
$300 per lot in one county and at $560 per lot in an adjacent county. The court held the
trial court had properly dismissed the cause of action against the Department of Revenue to
compel the equalization of assessments between the two counties. Mr. Justice England
stated:
The Spooner [v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1976)] and Armstrong [v. State
ex rel. Beaty, 69 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1954)] decisions quite clearly state that inter-
county assessment uniformity is not required by the Constitution, and that varia-
tions even between adjacent counties are not a basis for lowering tax assessments
which are neither greater than 100% of fair market value nor unequally or im-
properly determined in relation to other properties within the same county. These
principles flow from the constitutional directive that Florida's counties each have
their own tax appraiser.
Id. at 386 (footnotes omitted).
Neither the Spooner nor the Armstrong case focused on the question of inequality in the
context of a multicounty district. Indeed, the court in Armstrong took great care to analyze
the equal protection arguments with an eye on the taxing jurisdiction:
If, within a taxing district or within a county, the method of assessment is equal
and uniform as to every piece of property in the district or county, and every
property owner is treated alike, there is no inequality of assessment as to separate
pieces of property in the district or county justifying equalization. The fact that
while unimproved land in Franklin County may be assessed by a particular
method in Franklin County, but is equal and uniform as to every piece of property
and everyone is treated alike in that county, could have no effect upon a different
method of assessment in Madison County, where the method employed in
Madison County is equal and uniform as to every piece of property in Madison
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In Dade County v. Salter,17 the first of two reported decisions
to address the issue of intracounty inequality, the plaintiff alleged
that his property had been assessed at 100% of full cash value
while "nearby property," had been assessed at only 75%.2"8 The
Florida Supreme Court's decision concerned the procedural point
only, holding that the plaintiffs complaint had stated a cause of
action even though the plaintiff had not alleged that his property
had been assessed in excess of full fair market value.24'9 The opin-
ion quoted with approval, however, from a United States Supreme
Court decision which addressed the question of the proper remedy.
This Court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose property
alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true value is to have his as-
sessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others
are taxed even though this is a departure from the requirement of
statute. The conclusion is based upon the principle that where it
is impossible to secure both the standard of the true value, and
the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter require-
ment is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the
law.2 5
0
In the second case, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. County of Dade,2 51 the plaintiff alleged that its property had
been assessed at full fair market value, but the property appraiser
had generally assessed real property at a ratio of approximately
eighty percent of its market value and had assessed tangible per-
sonal property at a level "substantially lower" than plaintiff's
property.2 2 The court noted the two competing constitutional
principles involved: the right to equal protection which is infringed
if a taxpayer's property is assessed at a percentage of full fair mar-
ket value substantially higher than the percentage at which other
property in the county is generally assessed and the constitutional
County. But, of course, all assessments must be made at full cash value as re-
quired by the statute. Sec. 193.11, Florida Statutes 1951 and F.S.A.
• . . We still have the principle that the method of assessment shall be equal
and uniform for each piece of property in the taxing district. In this case the tax-
ing district is Madison County.
69 So. 2d at 321.
247. 194 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1966).
248. Id. at 589.
249. Id. at 591-92.
250. Id. at 591, quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446
(1923).
251. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. County of Dade, 275 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1973).
252. Id. at 5.
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mandate to property appraisers to assess all property at its full fair
market value.2 " The court also recognized the impracticality of
providing relief by requiring the plaintiffs to institute and prose-
cute proceedings against the property appraiser to require him to
raise the assessed valuations of all other properties in the county
to the same level as the plaintiff's property.2 In remanding the
case to the trial judge for consideration of the proper formulation
of relief, the court seemed to indicate that both constitutional
principles could be adhered to by dealing with the tax liability im-
posed on the plaintiff's property, rather than tinkering with the
assessed valuations of property within the county:
This question [of relief] is admittedly complicated, i.e., determin-
ing petitioner's fair share of the tax burden based upon a calcula-
tion of the ad valorem taxes petitioner would have been required
to pay if the tax roll had been at full value, consihering [sic] the
established level of real property assessment and considering the
level at which personal property had been assessed. ""'
5. Millage Limitations
A special district (other than a municipal service taxing or bene-
fit unit) which has been granted the power to levy ad valorem
taxes may do so at a rate not in excess of a millage which has been
authorized by law and approved by a vote of the electors."' A mu-
nicipal service taxing or benefit unit may levy ad valorem taxes at
a rate not to exceed the constitutional limit fixed for municipal
purposes of ten mills and may do so without a referendum
253. Id. at 7-8.
254. Id. at 8, quoting Dade County v. Salter, 194 So. 2d at 591.
255. Id. at 10.
256. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b). Section 9(b) further provides that it is to be "by vote of
the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation." The
freeholder limitation was held unconstitutional in Fair v. Fair, 317 F. Supp. 859, 860 (M.D.
Fla. 1970), on the authority of City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). The
freeholder provision, however, is separable from the remainder of the section, which is valid.
Tornillo v. Dade County School Bd., 458 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Op. Att'y Gen.
Fla. 072-333 (1972). The constitutional millage limits and the referendum requirement for
special district millages were new to the 1968 revision of the constitution. Special districts
which were levying ad valorem taxes pursuant to law which had not been approved in a
referendum were allowed to continue levying such taxes under the authority of article XII, §
15 of the Florida Constitution. Nor would the ad valorem taxing power of a special district
be subject to the ten mill cap imposed for "county purposes." Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 069-71
(1969). Regarding millage limitations generally, see 31 FLA. JUR. Taxation §§ 238-45 (1974).
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election.157
All governmental entities, including special districts, must, in
the exercise of their taxing powers, levy taxes in accordance with
law. 58 Chapter 200 of the Florida Statutes contains some impor-
tant provisions pertaining to the millage which may be levied by a
special district.25 To reiterate, a different treatment is provided
for municipal service taxing or benefit units. A municipal service
taxing or benefit unit may levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not to
exceed ten mills regardless of the rate of ad valorem taxation im-
posed by the county for county purposes.2 0 On the other hand, all
other special districts2 1 are limited to a millage which, when
added to the millage levied by the county, cannot exceed ten
mills. 262
In the event a county and the special districts located within it
desire to levy ad valorem taxes in the aggregate in excess of ten
mills, the county's budget commission or board if it has one, or the
board of county commissioners otherwise, is vested with the au-
thority to apportion the permissible ten mills among the compet-
257. FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q) (1981); FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b); Gallant v. Stephens,
358 So. 2d 536.
258. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(a).
259. FLA. STAT. § 200.111 (1981):
The term "district" is defined to mean special districts having the power to levy
taxes or require the levy of taxes, including but not limited to boards, commis-
sions, authorities and agencies having authority to levy taxes or require the levy of
taxes but shall not include special school districts or multicounty districts.
260. The municipal service taxing or benefit unit is viewed as being subject not to the
millage limit for special districts contained in article VII, § 9(b) of the state constitution,
but to the millage limit for municipal purposes (ten mills). Gallant v. Stephens, 358 So. 2d
536. Section 200.071(3) of the Florida Statutes echoes this sentiment. The validity of the
statutory provision was upheld in Tucker v. Underdown, 356 So. 2d 251.
261. Other than special school districts or multicounty districts. FLA. STAT. § 200.111
(1981). See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 077-105 (1977).
262. FLA. STAT. § 200.071(1) (1981):
Except as otherwise provided herein, no aggregate ad valorem tax millage shall
be levied against real and tangible personal property by counties and districts as
herein defined in excess of 10 mills on the dollar of assessed* value, except for
special benefits and debt service on obligations issued in connection therewith,
and except for that millage authorized in § 9, Art. VII of the State Constitution.
The Attorney General opined that this provision would apply to ad valorem taxes levied
by a countywide special hospital district created by a special act even though the act specifi-
cally provided it was not to be so limited and the act was approved in a referendum. Op.
Att'y Gen. Fla. 072-340 (1972).
Article VII, § 9(b) limits the rate of ad valorem taxation, other than for the payment of
bonds or for periods of not more than two years when approved by vote of the electors, for
"all county purposes" to ten mills. In State ex rel. Dade County v. Dickinson, 230 So. 2d 130
(Fla. 1970), this provision was held to embrace home-rule and consolidated governments as
well as traditional counties.
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ing taxing entities.263 In addition, the aggregate ten mill limitation
may be increased for up to two years if approved in a referendum
election.""
In order to facilitate the consolidation of county and municipal
governments,268 authorization is granted to a county providing mu-
nicipal services within a municipality to levy more than ten, but
not to exceed twenty, mills, with a corresponding and equal de-
crease in the municipality's ten mill limit.26e Likewise, if the mu-
nicipality is assuming the burden of providing a county service, the
municipality's millage limit may be increased with a corresponding
decrease in the county's limit.
Finally, if a special district encompasses territory in more than
one county, it is excluded from the definition of a "district" for
purposes of chapter 200,111 and thus from the aggregate ten mill
rule discussed above to which intracounty special districts are sub-
ject ." Ad valorem taxes levied by such multicounty districts are to
be reported by the respective county areas in accordance with the
procedures of chapter 200.' 9
D. Bonds and Certificates of Indebtedness
Like other governmental entities, a special district may incur
bonded indebtedness provided the Legislature has expressly or im-
pliedly authorized it to do so 270 and has limited the maximum
amount of such indebtedness. 7 1 Indeed, legislative authorization
to issue bonds has itself been used to imply the grant of taxing
power to the extent necessary to pay the interest on the bonds and
to create a sinking fund for the repayment of the principal.' De-
263. FLA. STAT. § 200.071(2) (1981).
264. FLA. STAT. § 200.091 (1981):
The millage authorized to be levied in § 200.071 for county purposes, including
districts therein, may be increased for periods not exceeding 2 years, provided
such levy has been approved by a majority of those voting in an election partici-
pated in only by the qualified electors of the county or district who pay taxes on
real or personal property.
265. Consolidation of the government of a county and one or more municipalities located
therein is authorized by FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
266. FLA. STAT. § 200.141 (1981).
267. Id. § 200.111.
268. Id. § 200.071(1). See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
269. FLA. STAT. § 200.191(4)(c) (1981).
270. State ex rel. Harrington v. City of Pompano, 188 So. 610, 620 (Fla. 1938).
271. State ex tel. Atlantic--Gulf Special Rd. and Bridge Dist. v. Bass, 118 So. 212, 214
(Fla. 1928).
272. Id.; State v. Ft. Pierce Inlet Dist., 115 So. 547 (1927); accord State v. Special Tax
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pending upon the special district's legislative grant of authority
and the terms of the bond issue itself, the indebtedness reflected in
bonds sold by a special district may be repaid from general reve-
nues of the district, including ad valorem taxation or special as-
sessments. Alternatively, repayment may be restricted to revenue
generated by the district from providing facilties or services.2 7 8
Since 1930274 the Florida Constitution has required voter ap-
proval prior to the issuance of bonds by a special district. The pro-
vision currently in effect provides:
Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and
local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds,
certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certifi-
cates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than
twelve months after issuance only:
(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law
and only when approved by vote of the electors who are
owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxa-
tion; or
(b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemp-
tion premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost
rate.27
5
The converse of the above prohibition is that such bonds or certifi-
cates of indebtedness may be issued without voter referendum if
they are to be repaid from sources other than ad valorem taxes.2 6
The statutory authority for a special district to issue bonds was
often contained in the enabling legislation which authorized the
creation of the special district, and thus was not uniform. The Leg-
islature has now provided a uniform procedure which may be fol-
lowed for the validation of bonds issued by special districts and
other governmental entities.2 7 A proceeding may be brought by a
special district pursuant to the bond validation law in circuit court
for the purpose of determining the authority of the district to in-
cur the bonded indebtedness, whether all essential proceedings
School Dist. No. 5 of Dade County, 144 So. 356, 362 (Fla. 1932) (refunding bonds).
273. See 26 FLA. JUR., Public Securities and Obligations § 168 (1959).
274. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6 (1885), as amended.
275. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 12. The freeholder requirement is the same as in article VII,
§ 9(b) discussed supra in note 256, and for the same reason is of doubtful validity.
276. State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978); Lake Howell Water &
Reclamation Dist. v. State, 268 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1972); State v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
214 So. 2d 723, 724 (Fla. 1968); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 078-110 (1978).
277. FLA. STAT. ch. 75 (1981).
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prior to the issuance of the bonds have been taken,2'7 8 and gener-
ally to resolve with finality any issues which might later call into
question the validity of the bonds to be issued. 270 However, before
validation proceedings may be instituted pursuant to the proce-
dures of this general law, the special district must either hold an
election to authorize the issuance of the subject bonds or certifi-
cates of indebtedness and show that the election was in favor of
their issuance, or, when permitted by law, adopt an ordinance or
resolution providing for the issuance of the debt obligations in ac-
cordance with law.2 80
The other recourse for validating bonds or certificates of indebt-
edness is post hoc curative legislation. Where the Legislature has
the power to authorize the issuance of the debt obligations in the
first instance, but some circumstance such as an error in the proce-
dure of their issuance has brought their validity into question, sub-
sequent legislation may be enacted to cure the defect and make the
obligations valid and enforceable. 81
V. EXPANSION OR CONTRACTION, CONSOLIDATION AND DISSOLUTION
The Legislature has not prescribed any general law procedures
to be followed for expanding or contracting the geographical juris-
diction of a special district.282 Presumably, the same procedures
applicable to the creation of a special district in the first instance
should be followed, viz., "by special act of the Legislature or by
ordinance of a county or municipal governing body having jurisdic-
tion over the area affected. ' 2 83 The important issue which arises
with respect to the ad valorem taxing power of a special district
whose boundaries have been changed (either to include territory
previously excluded or to exclude previously included territory, or
both) is to what extent is it proper to subject the property in the
affected area to the district's ad valorem tax levy.2" Generally, a
278. Id. § 75.04.
279. Id. § 75.09. The procedures of this chapter are exclusive; a suit for declaratory judg-
ment is not appropriate. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. City of Opalocka, 74 So. 2d 296, 298
(Fla. 1954).
280. FLA. STAT. § 75.03 (1981).
281. Middleton v. St. Augustine, 29 So. 421 (Fla. 1900).
282. The Municipal Annexation or Contraction Act, provides general law standards and
procedures for adjusting the boundaries of municipalities, superseding conflicting provisions
on the subject contained in any special act or municipal charter in effect on October 1, 1974.
It does not apply to special districts. FLA. STAT. ch. 171 (1981).
283. FLA. STAT. § 165.041(2) (1981).
284. M. POCK, INDEPENDENT SPECIAL DIsTRIcTs: A SoLUrION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA
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special district has the power to impose ad valorem taxes on prop-
erty which was within its territorial jurisdiction as of January 1 of
the year in question; property added to that jurisdiction after Jan-
uary 1 would not be subject to that year's ad valorem levy.2 85 Con-
versely, property which was excluded from a district would remain
subject to the levy for the year of exclusion, but not thereafter.2 8
If a special district is to be merged with another special district,
or with a municipality or county, or if it is to be dissolved, the
general law provisions of the Formation of Local Governments
Act 2 87 must be followed. Merger is accomplished by the adoption of
concurrent ordinances of affected municipalities or counties, and
resolution of the governing body of each affected special district.2 8
The merger procedures may be initiated either by the governing
bodies of the affected units, or by petition of ten percent of the
qualified voters of the area.28 If a special district is merged with a
municipality, the municipality receives title to all property and as-
sumes all indebtedness of the district.2 90 If two or more special dis-
tricts are merged, the surviving entity likewise takes title to all
property of and assumes all debts of the merged district. The
merger agreement also must provide for the proper determination
of the allocation of indebtedness so assumed and the manner of
retiring such debt.2 91
The dissolution of a special district may be accomplished either
by special act of the Legislature or by ordinance of the district's
governing body which has been approved by a vote of the elec-
tors.2 9 Before such a dissolution may take place, however, the
county or a municipality must be demonstrably able to provide the
PROBLEMS 160-84 (1962).
285. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 071-255 (1971). All ad valorem taxes levied in Florida constitute
a first lien on the property against which the taxes are assessed from January 1 of the year
in which the taxes are levied. FLA. STAT. § 197.056 (1981). See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 075-32
(1975).
286. However, in State v. Jensen Rd. & Bridge Dist., 198 So. 105 (Fla. 1940), the court
held that where a special district had sold bonds, pledging ad valorem taxes on all property
then within the district in payment therefor, it was proper to levy the taxes on property
which was excluded by legislative act from the district subsequent to the sale of the bonds.
287. FLA. STAT. ch. 165 (1981). Its provisions preempt all conflicting provisions of general
or special law except in counties operating under a home rule charter which provides for
another exclusive method. Id. § 165.022.
288. Id. § 165.041(4).
289. Id. § 165.041(5)(a).
290. Id. § 165.071(2).
291. Id.
292. Id. § 165.051. This section also specifies the details of the election and notice
thereof.
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services which had been provided by the district and an equitable
arrangement must be made with respect to any vested rights of
district employees and any bonded indebtedness.'
Finally, there is a procedure for the involuntary dissolution of
inactive special districts. Upon certification to the Secretary of
State by the Department of Veterans and Community Affairs that
the special district has not had appointed or elected a governing
body for the past four years, or has not operated within the two
immediately preceeding years, and that certain notice provisions
have been complied with, the Secretary may issue a proclamation
declaring the district inactive.2 9' If such a special district owes any
debt at the time of the proclamation, any of its property or assets
become subject to legal process for the payment of the debt.s"9 Af-
ter the payment of outstanding debts, any remaining property es-
cheats to the county in which it is located.' Conversely, if the
district's indebtedness exceeds its assets, and it is necessary to levy
a tax on the property which had been in the district in order to
pay the indebtedness, the county commissioners are authorized to
order such tax to be assessed, levied and collected by the same
procedures as those concerning county taxes.'9 The Governor is to
report to the Legislature the special laws authorizing the creation
of, or relating only to the powers or duties of, any special district
declared inactive, apparently for the purpose of identifying such
special acts for legislative repeal.2"8
VI. CONCLUSION
Special districts with ad valorem taxing power are an integral
part of local government in Florida today. They provide a panoply
of services, governmental and proprietary, throughout the state.
The Legislature has taken some important, positive steps in recent
years to provide uniform, exclusive procedures for the creation,
modification and dissolution of special districts. These procedures
are in harmony with the general trend of providing authority and
responsibility at the local level for addressing matters of concern.
293. Id. § 165.061(4).
294. Id. § 165.052(1).
295. Id. § 165.052(3).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. § 165.052(4). Repeal is facilitated by providing that the Secretary of State's
"proclamation of inactive status shall be sufficient notice as required by s. 10, Art. III of the
State Constitution to authorize the Legislature to repeal any special laws so reported." Id.
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Additionally, by requiring that a census of special districts be
taken, and by imposing financial disclosure and reporting require-
ments on special districts, legislative and public oversight has been
much improved.
Unfortunately, some important fundamental concepts of tax pol-
icy seem to have been brushed aside in the rush to fashion a rem-
edy for the rapidly increasing urbanization of the unincorporated
areas of Florida's sixty-seven counties. The concept that a tax im-
posed for even general governmental purposes must provide some,
albeit remote, benefit to the property or persons taxed has hope-
fully not been entirely discarded, but only overlooked in the pas-
sion of the moment. Similarly, the significance of the clarion call of
"Taxation Without Representation" will hopefully be more fully
appreciated by the Florida Supreme Court when it is next con-
fronted with the issue of property being taxed by a municipal ser-
vice taxing or benefit unit which encompasses an area of a county
in which none of the members of the board of county commission-
ers resides.
